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Introduction 58
Global commons are commonly defined as those portions of the planet that are localized 59 beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. They are areas such as the high seas, Antarctica, 60 the atmosphere and outer space, not susceptible to national appropriation; the natural 61 resources found in these spaces are intended for the benefit of all mankind (Buck 1998: 5-62 6; Joyner 1998: 25-27; Vogler 2000: 1-6). This original concept of global commons has 63 recently been expanded and the biodiversity of the entire planet has started to be 64 interpreted as an 'emerging global common' (Flitner 1998: 144 ) "whose misuse negatively 65 affects not just local or regional populations, but us all" (Goldman 1998: 35) . The 66 commons aspect of the world biomass does not lie in its location or appropriation, but on 67 the 'globally common effect' that its destruction may cause (Joyner 1998: 20) . By 68 adaptation of this argument to fisheries, the mismanagement of fisheries resources located 69 in the area under national jurisdiction, i.e. the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has 70 consequences for biodiversity that do not stop at the EEZ. This makes areas of national 71 jurisdiction such as the EEZ the object of a global responsibility (Treves 13.10.2008). 72
The solution to the tragedy of global commons cannot be represented by the state, 73 but rather by international institutions (Flitner 1998: 144; Joyner 1998: 26-29; Goldman 74 1998b: 36-39). Understood as sets of formal rules contained in international agreements, 75 international institutions aim at orienting national governments towards specific policy 76 Page 4 of 24 options and determining a change in national policies and practices (Keohane and others 77 1993; Stokke and others 1999) . A complex institutional framework for fisheries 78 management has been developed at the global level by the United Nations and its agencies 79 through binding and non-binding agreements (Turrell 2004) . In this framework, marine 80 protected areas (MPAs) have been recognized as a useful tool for the conservation of the 81 marine environment and its living resources (Gubbay 1995; Pomeroy and others 2005; 82 World Bank 2006). The 4 th World Wilderness Congress (1987) has extensively defined 83
MPAs as "Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and 84 associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or 85 other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment" (Gubbay 2004: 2) . 86
The definition covers areas that are known by different names (e.g., marine nature reserves 87 and marine parks) and established for different purposes (protection of marine living 88 resources, protection of historic resources, etc.) (Charles 2001 The establishment and implementation of MPAs in Senegal represents an 108 interesting case for understanding such interaction and untangling the interplay between 109 international institutions and national actors. A better understanding of the knots tangling 110 institutions and actors has been pursued through the adoption of an actor-centred 111 institutionalist approach. Actor-centred institutionalism (ACI) constitutes, indeed, our 112 theoretical anchorage and is explained in the following section. 113 114 115
International institutions and national actors 116
The theoretical framework proposed by Scharpf (1997) analyzes the interactions between 117 institutions and actors. The latter are understood by Sharpf (1997) as 'collective and 118 corporate actors' rather than 'individuals acting on their own account'. Hence, they include 119 "political parties, labor unions, government ministries, central banks, or international 120 organizations" (Scharpf 1997: 39) . Scharpf (1997) acknowledges that institutions (or 121 formal rules) influence actors and their interactions, but not in a 'deterministic sense'. In 122 the context of a specific institutional setting and on the basis of personal beliefs and 123 interests, actors may, indeed, "evade or […] violate the norms and rules that they are 124 supposed to follow" (Scharpf 1997: 21) . The result is that a given policy problem defines a 125 specific 'actor constellation' (i.e. the plurality of actors involved in the problem at stake), 126
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Even in the presence of 'negotiated agreements', such as international institutions 129 (or rules), the final outcome is then determined not by the agreement, or institutions (which 130 rather function as a remote cause), but by the "subsequent interactions of parties committed 131 to observe its rules" (taken as the proximate variables) (Scharpf 1997: 25) . Put differently, 132 according to Scharpf (1997) , whenever a normative framework, or regime, is reached 133 consensually, each single actor is free to respect the obligations contained in the agreed 134 framework. It follows that the capacity to solve a specific policy issue rather lies in the 135 actor constellation than in the institutional context in which actors' interactions take place. 136
In the case of international agreements, the parties (or actors) who interact and 137 ultimately determine the final outcome of international rules are not simply the nation-138 states. Complex domestic constellations of multiple actors may undercut national 139 commitments to international agreements: political elites (at national, regional and local 140 level), bureaucracies and implementing agencies, economic interests and business, target 141 groups and the civil society (Scharpf 1997 ). Furthermore, according to Andresen and 142 others (1995) , the implementation of international instruments needs to be understood as a 143 process that includes three phases: 144 1. from the international provision to the enacting national law (i.e. enactment); 145 2. from this law to its executing acts (or administrative rules) (i.e. execution); 146 3. and from such rules to the induced behavioural change through the application 147 of those acts (i.e. enforcement). 
Data collection 164
The study of the establishment and implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in 165
Senegal has relied on process-tracing as the research method. Used in within-case analyses, 166 the method of process-tracing incorporates historical narratives of specific events within 167 general theoretical frameworks elaborated in social sciences (George and Bennett 2005: 168 205 ). Events and chronologies are crucial building, but the final purpose is to create a 'case 169 study' with a strong analytical component, not a mere 'case history' (Pettigrew 1997: 339) . 170 Therefore, the causal mechanism (or process) at work in a specific situation is not simply 171 traced, but mapped in a 'theoretically informed way' (Checkel 2005 In conclusion, the enactment phase has revealed three interesting points. 271
1.
The coupling between a political commitment at the highest level of the Senegalese The point is that each minister wants to have more competences, hence more power and 309 prestige, but -most of all -more job positions. They allow employing more people, hence, 310 maintaining personal clienteles and gaining more (political) support for future elections. 311
The result is that each minister tries to influence the President's view on what branches of 312 the public administration should be enhanced and broadened. This is often done by 313 exploiting issues recurrent in public debates, either internally or at the international level, 314 as in the case of marine protected areas (Interviews with a civil servant, Dakar, March 315 2009; confirmation to these statements have been given by academic researchers in 316 Senegal). 317
In conclusion, two relevant aspects emerge from the execution process. 318 1.
The state bureaucracy, absent during the previous phase (enactment), plays a key 319 role during this stage; in other words, it is during the definition of the 320 implementation framework that administrative agencies, moved by different 321 interests, become the protagonist. 322
2.
This bureaucratic politics can represent a severe obstacle to any initiative of reform 323 (in existing policies and administrative arrangements), unless a strong political 324 leadership commits to specific actions in the framework of a clear policy strategy. 325 326 Page 14 of 24
Enforcement and management 327
While fisheries policy is still an exclusive competence of the central administration 328 (Camara 2008) , the management of environmental resources has been delegated to local 329 governments (compétences déléguées) since the 1996 (Rondinelli and Minis 1990) , at least 330 on paper. In this framework, marine protected areas (MPAs) are designed to be co-331 managed by the central administration and local communities (i.e., local executives and 332 societal stakeholders) through a 'management committee' (comité de gestion) which 333 directly involves fisheries associations and NGOs. Coordination and supervision is 334 nonetheless supposed to be ensured by the central administration through the 'conservator' 335 In conclusion, during enforcement, the following elements need to be stressed. 381
1.
Conflicts at the top of the administration weaken monitoring and sanctioning 382 activities at the bottom during enforcement. 383
2.
A climate of administrative inaction and tolerance for violations by street-level 384 bureaucrats weakens even further enforcement activities. While the enactment phase has been mainly played at the highest political level and has 423 relied on a situation of non-opposition from the side of target groups, the execution phase 424 has taken place in the bureaucratic arena. Here, competition on competences have blocked 425 the entire process and hindered the actual functioning of MPAs. Such bureaucratic politics 426 and conflicts among ministries have also compromised the enforcement of the areas, at 427 least temporarily, until a direct intervention of the Presidency solved the vacuum left in the 428 monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. 429
Although enactment has been characterized by a partial consensus from fishers to 430 the establishment of MPAs, their opposition increased once the initiative could determine a 431 visible change in the form of exclusion of fishing activities from a specific area. 432
Awareness building by NGOs and the inclusion of target groups in management activities 433 as a solution to conflicts has been less effective than expected. Only one area works in 434 practice, the one where fishing activity has always been less intense; here, the stakes are 435 low. Furthermore, strong enforcement against violations seems difficult not only because 436 of the absence of means, but -more importantly -for the political weight embodied by the 437 artisanal fishers' constituency which determines a diffuse administrative tolerance by those 438 in charge of applying the law (i.e. street-level bureaucrats). 439 440 6.3. The perception of crises and urgencies by domestic actors is likely to increase 441 national support for international institutions. 442
The key role of fisheries for poverty reduction and economic growth has been 443 acknowledged by the political elite in recent documents (see footnote 1). Such 444 acknowledgment of the relevance of the fisheries sector goes hand in hand with the 445 recognition of the crisis in fish catch reported by policy makers (as a mere example see 446 MME 2007 and MME 2008) and directly experienced by fishermen (as reported in 447 interviews with civil servants, artisanal fisheries organizations and NGOs, Dakar, March 448 2009). The exploitation of fish stock beyond any limit of sustainability has, indeed, 449 produced effects which have become visible in the last twenty years and are now even 450 more evident. 451
